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Demolition Losses in Leasing: Current or Deferred
Federal Income Tax Deductions
INTRODUCTION

Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 a current income tax
deduction for the remaining undepreciated basis of a demolished
building used in a business is an ordinary loss offsetting ordinary income. Continued capitalization of the undepreciated basis would result in periodic amortization of the building and a lessened tax benefit by postponing the total deduction of the loss for a period of years.
For example, if a taxpayer' has $200,000 of unearned taxable income
for a given year without any demolition loss deduction, he pays
approximately $111,000 in taxes. A current deduction for a building
with a remaining undepreciated basis of $75,000 will reduce his taxable income to $125,000 and his tax to $61,000. On the other hand,
if the taxpayer must amortize the undepreciated basis over a 99-year
lease,3 he is only amortizing $757.58 annually. This small deduction
results in a negligible tax reduction. 4 Planning for a current income
tax deduction of the undepreciated basis of a demolished building involves a careful weighing of the conflicting positions of the Internal
Revenue Service 5 and the courts on the conditions required for such
a deduction.
Conflict has developed in the circuits" over the proper interpretation
and application of the Income Tax Regulations7 on demolition losses.
The split has involved the wording of regulation 1.165-3(b)(2) and
1.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 26 U.S.C. (1954)

[hereinafter referred to as INT.

REV.

CODE or CODE].

2. Using Table 1 for married taxpayers filing joint returns under INT. REV. CODE,
§ 1(a).
3. See CODE section 167 regarding methods of depreciation by the owner of depreciable property and CODE section 178 concerning depreciation or amortization of improvements made by the lessee on the lessor's property.
4. The taxpayer must pay $110,457 in taxes.
5. Hereinafter referred to as the Service or the IRS.
6. The district courts in the Fifth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit held for the taxpayer and allowed current demolition deductions; both district courts were reversed on
the appellate level.
7. Hereinafter referred to as the regulations.
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its literal or substantive application to demolition losses. The Ninth'
and Fifth 9 Circuits have favored a literal application of the crucial
words "pursuant to the requirements of a lease or the requirements
of an agreement which resulted in a lease." They have interpreted
this phrase to mean that the courts will disallow a current deduction
for the remaining undepreciated basis of a building only if demolition
is a specific requirement of the lease terms. The Seventh"0 and
Eighth 1 Circuits and the United States Tax Court 12 have not allowed
particular words used in the lease to control the deductibility of demolition losses. Emphasizing all the facts and circumstances of the
lease negotiations and the final lease terms, these courts have particularly looked ,to the underlying intent of the parties and any compensation for the demolition.
The courts have articulated certain standards to evaluate the taxpayer's claim to a current Code 1 3 deduction in the context of the disputed regulation. These standards include three major issues: the
wording problem; the question of intent; and the presence of compensation. The courts have split over the weight they should accord to
the wording of the regulation vis-h-vis the wording of the lease.
The courts have also split over whether to consider the intent of
the parties to demolish and whether forming the intent prior to or
subsequent to the execution of the lease makes any difference. The
inquiry into intent has included factors such as: the length of time
between acquisition and demolition; pre-lease negotiations allocating
the cost of demolition between the parties; the comparison of the lease
term and the remaining useful life of the demolished buildings; the
suitability of the building for the lessee's intended use at the time of
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(2) (1960):
(2)
If a lessor or lessee of real property demolishes the buildings situated
thereon pursuant to the requirements of a lease or the requirements of an
agreement which resulted in a lease, no deduction shall be allowed to the lessor under section 165(a) on account of the demolition of the old buildings.
However, the adjusted basis of the demolished buildings, increased by the net
cost of demolition and decreased by the net proceeds from demolition, shall

be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be amortized over the term

thereof.
8. Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964).

9. Hightower v. United States, 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
10. Landerman v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 967 (1972).
11. Foltz v. United States, 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
12.

Hereinafter referred

to as the Tax Court; see Levinson v. Commissioner,

59 T.C. 676 (1973).
13.

(a)

165(a):
GENERAL RULE-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sus-

INT. REV. CODE §

tained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
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acquisition; the determination of the unfeasibility of planned alterations only after the execution of the lease; and the use of a demolition
clause as merely a protective device for the lessee.
Finally, the courts have disagreed whether the execution of the
lease resulted in compensation to the lessor for the demolition and
thereby precluded a current deduction. In evaluating this issue of
consideration, the courts have scrutinized: the propriety of arguing
about economic consideration; rental rates before and after demolition;
the party bearing the cost of demolition; the requirement to rebuild
and any specifications by the lessor on the type of building erected;
the presence of a reverter clause in the lease; the general or special
usefulness of the building erected; and a real intent to sell versus an
apparent intent to lease.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Understanding the current issues in the demolition deduction controversy involves a careful review of the standards enunciated in the
early precedent. Until 1959 the IRS had not proposed regulations
dealing with demolition losses in the leasing context.1 4 The Code section concerning losses, enacted in the Revenue Act of 1918,", has
never specifically mentioned demolition losses. Without any statutory or regulatory rule-making, the courts freely formulated their own
rules and generally applied a "substitution of assets" theory. If the
demolition resulted in the substitution of one asset (the lease) for
another asset (the old building) of equal value, they disallowed current deductions for the remaining undepreciated basis of the demolished building. These courts required continued capitalization and
amortization of the remaining basis over the lease period. The courts
treated the demolition loss merely as a cost of the acquisition of the
lease. The early judicial inquiry into demolition losses looked to the
financial implications of each factual situation:
The determination of the controversy seems to depend altogether
on the solution of the question as to whether, by the acquisition
14. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(d), 24 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8180 (1959), which
provided:
(d) Buildings demolished to obtain lease. If, pursuant to the terms of a
lease, the lessor of real property demolishes buildings situated thereon, no deduction shall be allowed to the lessor under section 165(a) on account of

the demolition of the buildings.

Likewise, if, pursuant to the terms of a lease,

the lessee of real property demolishes the buildings, no deduction shall be al-

lowed to the lessor. However, the adjusted basis of the demolished buildings
shall be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be amortized over
the term thereof.
15. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 214(a), 40 Stat. 1066-68.
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1974

Deductibility of Demolition Losses

of the long-term lease, the lessors added to their assets, or substituted property for another form of capital assets. 16
If the answer to this judicial inquiry was yes, the taxpayer did not
get a present deduction for his undepreciated basis in the demolished
building. Instead, he had to amortize the basis over the life of the
lease. If the lease required the lessee to demolish the existing buildings and replace them with new structures, the early precedent found
grounds for invoking a "substitution of assets" rationale. In Young
v. Commissioner 7 and Spinks Realty Co. v. Burnet,'8 the lease required
the lessees to erect buildings on the leased premises. The Spinks
lease required demolition, and although the Young lease did not mention demolition, destruction of the existing buildings was necessary for
the new buildings required under the lease. In both cases the courts
found that the value of the demolished buildings was an investment
in and a contribution to the cost of the lessor in obtaining the lease.'
Since the lessors still received the total value of the tax benefits of
the demolished buildings by ,the end of the lease term, amortization
of the undepreciated basis of the old buildings over the life of the
lease was no detriment to the lessors.
The Young court used a pure "substitution of assets" theory and
did not enunciate specific standards for measuring compensation. The
court indicated that the "substitution of assets" theory particularly
applied since the demolished buildings were relatively new.
There can be no question that, where a landowner finds it necessary to remove structures unsuitable for further use, he may have
a reduction from gross income for the loss. On the other hand,
where he finds it advantageous to remove substantial buildings in
order to secure a lease which will result in his having erected on
his property a new building, without money outlay on his part for
its construction, and to have assured a large rental income for a
long term of years, it would seem just and reasonable that the
value of the buildings removed be charged as a contribution to
the cost of securing his20 lease, and as a part of the investment then
made for that purpose.
The court in Spinks followed the rationale in Young. 2 1 The Spinks
court stated that the lessor had no uncompensated loss from the de16.

Young v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 691, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.

652 (1932).
17. 59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 652 (1932).
18. 62 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 636 (1933).

19.
20.
21.

59 F.2d at 693.
Id. at 692-93.
See also Anabma Realty Corporation v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 282 U.S. 854 (1930).
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molition because he obtained valuable lease rights for a long term,
a new building erected at no cost to himself and title to the building
upon termination of the lease by a reverter clause.
Blumenfield Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner2 2 extended the "substitution of assets" theory. Unlike Young and Spinks, the parties
in Blumenfield did not contemplate demolition of the existing building
before or after the signing of the lease. The lessee of a 25-year
lease contemplated remodeling the building for use as a multi-story
parking garage. The lease specifically stated that before any remodeling took place, the lessor had to approve the remodeling plans. Conditions later imposed by the city and county authorities made the remodeling plans of the lessee impossible; the lessee and the lessor then
executed an agreement with an option to buy which permitted demolition by the lessee.
The Blumenfield court found that the lessor had not suffered any
demolition loss and disallowed a current deduction. The demolition
did not curtail the lessee's obligations. The period of the new lease
extended beyond the useful life of the building. The permission to
demolish looked primarily toward the sale of the property. Since the
building no longer had any economic usefulness to the lessor, its razing and replacement by an advantageous lease benefited the lessor.23
The lessor, however, did not require a new building for the razed
structure, but the Blumenfield court did not consider this fact strong
enough to warrant a current deduction. Thus the Blumenfield court
had no difficulty extending the "substitution of assets" rationale to a
case that did not involve the replacement of a demolished building.
If the demolition resulted in the substitution of one asset (the lease)
for another asset (the old building) of equal value, the pre-regulation
cases like Young, Spinks and Blumenfield 4 denied a current tax de22.

23.

23 T.C. 665 (1955), afj'd, 232 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956).

Nickoll's Estate v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1960), was decided

by the district court before the regulation was adopted.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed a denial of the current deduction. The court applied a "substitution of assets" rationale but stated that the decision was consonant with the then newly adopted
regulation:
The old building was substantially demolished as a necessary condition precedent to the execution of a remunerative lease under which taxpayers became
the owner of a remodeled building. The value of the old building which was
partially demolished is properly charged as a cost of acquiring valuable lease
rights and is to be amortized over the life of the lease.

Id. at 897.
24. See also Smith Real Estate Co. v. Page, 67 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1933); Myer
Dana v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 83 (1934); and Manning v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A.

286, 289 (1927), where the court states that a substitution of the lease for the de-

molished building provides a quid pro quo.
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duction to the lessor for the undepreciated basis of the demolished
building. These cases concentrated on real economic losses and did
not emphasize the initial intent of the parties regarding a later demolition. Whether the lease required or permitted demolition was also
an irrelevant fact to these courts. The Blumenfield court extended
the "substitution of assets" argument by denying a current tax deduction to the lessor when the sum of the periodic lease payments had
compensated the lessor for not only the fair rental value of the property but also for the value of the demolished building.
IRS POSITION
In its first proposed regulation on demolition losses, the IRS followed
prior case law and disallowed a current deduction for demolished
buildings if demolition was "pursuant to the terms of a lease."2 5 This
phrase, crucial to the holdings of prior case law, virtually forestalled
any current deduction regardless of intent at the time of the execution
of the lease. The finalized regulation, promulgated in 1960, changed
the wording and gave rise to the current disagreement among the circuits in its interpretation. This final regulation is basically a Service
relaxation of the "substitution of assets" theory, and it changed the
crucial language noted above to "pursuant to the requirements of a
lease or the requirements of an agreement which resulted in a
lease....
"26
At the December 4, 1959 hearings on the regulation as originally
proposed, a taxpayer's respresentative argued that even the precise
phrase "pursuant to the terms of a lease" could apply unfairly to a
situation in which a lessor began demolition with the general intention
of leasing but before he had reached any understanding with a specific
lessee. After an appeal that the regulation should reach only cases
in which the lease negotiations included the issue of demolition, the
discussion centered around the drafting of language to counter any
inequitable result without providing unintended tax loopholes.2 7 The
final wording apparently restricted disallowance of current tax deductions to situations in which the parties bargained for the later demolition in the lease negotiations.
This posture of the IRS is consonant with the long-standing rule
requiring capitalization of demolition expenses incident to replacement
25. See note 14 supra.
26. See note 7 supra (emphasis added).
27. Knight, New Regulations on Demolition Losses Formalize the Critical Intent
Test, 12 J. OF TAXATION 218, 220 (1960).
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or removal of existing structures if the intent to demolish existed at
the time of acquisition.2 8 If the intent to demolish existed at the date
of purchase, no portion of the purchase price is attributable to the
old structure or later added to the basis of a replacement building.
The entire purchase price is the cost of the land. By analogy, if demolition is a bargained-for right of the lease or incident to a contractual duty to erect a new building, the remaining undepreciated basis
of the demolished building should also be capitalized and attributed
to the lease through amortization over the life of the lease.
Since the adoption of the 1960 regulation, the Service has gradually
rejected the arguments advanced against the wording of the regulation
as originally proposed. The Commissioner has stated that the Service
will not follow the cases2 9 which allow current deductions for demolition losses regardless of whether the wording in the specific lease
grants permission to demolish or requires demolition. In a 1967
Revenue Ruling, the Service stated that the regulation merely reiterated
prior case law:
Such section of the regulations reflects the position established by
prior case law and was not intended to liberalize the position by
allowing the loss where the demolition
is permitted (as opposed
80
to required) by the terms of the lease.
To avoid any discrepancy between its Revenue Ruling and the regulations and to prevent any claim of detrimental reliance by taxpayers
on the 1960 regulation, the IRS proposed an amended regulation in
1972 that returns to the language "pursuant to the terms of a lease"
found in the 1959 proposed regulation. The new regulation attempts
to avoid the heavy reliance of some courts on the wording of the lease
"requiring" demolition before disallowing a current tax deduction for
the undepreciated basis of the demolished property."
REGULATION-LEASE WORDING

The problem that has arisen in the courts involves the interpretation of the word "requirement" in the regulation. Both sides agree
28. Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-3(a)(3) (1960):
(a) Intent to demolish formed at time of purchase ...
(3) The basis of any building acquired in replacement of the old buildings
shall not include any part of the basis of the property originally purchased even though such part was, at the time of purchase, allocated
to the buildings to be demolished for purposes of determining allowable

depreciation for the period before demolition.

29. Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964); Hightower v. United States,
463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).

30.
31.
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See note 14 supra.
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that prior case law holds that the regulations must be upheld unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.5 2 A
legislative regulation has the "force and effect of law" ; 3 an interpretive regulation does not bind a court in its construction of the Code.
An interpretive regulation, however, unless plainly at variance with
the Code, is persuasive. The regulations often supply the definitions
that Congress omitted:
Where the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction, a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method of its
application to specific cases not only is permissible but is to be
given great weight by the courts. And the same principle governs
where the statute merely expresses a general rule and invests the
Secretary of the Treasury with84 authority to promulgate regulations
appropriate to its enforcement.
Surprisingly, both sides claim that their irreconcilable positions do not
conflict with the tenor of the interpretive regulation on demolition
losses.
In Feldman v. Wood35 the Ninth Circuit followed the "plain-meaning" rule and allowed a current demolition loss deduction by a strict
construction of the term "requirement." The government, arguing for
a "substitution of assets" theory, asked the court to construe the term
"requirement" to include "permission." The court rejected the government's view: "A right to do an act is far different from a requirement to do it."36
The Seventh Circuit in Landerman v. Commissioner"7 has taken a
contrary position on the construction of the term "requirement.""8 In
Landerman the court disallowed the immediate demolition deduction.
If the demolition was an underlying condition of the lease, the court
of appeals agreed with the contention that amortization of the undepreciated basis was necessary whether the demolition was pursuant
to permission granted or required by the lease.
32. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Bingler
v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969).
33. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920).
34. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1935); INT. REv. CODE § 7805

(a).

35. 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
36. Id. at 265.
37. 454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972).
38. "Requirement" is defined as "something required, wanted, needed, called
for or demanded; a requisite or essential condition." Since the definition includes something which is wanted, needed or called for, only a restrictive interpretation of the word requirement would demand the presence of a formal
mandatory undertaking.
Id. at 340.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 632

Against the background of . . . the regulations it appears to us

that the present regulation was designed to narrow, but not alter,
the focal point of determination to the contemplation and bargaining stances of the parties at the time the lease arrangements were
made. In so doing, the vexatious problem of assessing the economic ramification of demolition by a lessee at a later period of the
lease would be obviated. In this context, the replacement of the
word "terms" with the word "requirements" becomes meaningful,
since an optional demolition
near the end of the lease would still
' 39
be pursuant to its "terms."
The courts in the later cases relied on the differing interpretations
of Feldman or Landerman. Following the Feldman rationale, the
Fifth Circuit in Hightower v. United States40 adopted a strict construction of the word "requirement." Because the regulation is defining
an ambiguous Code section, the courts favoring a current deduction
have construed the regulation most strongly against the Commissioner
invoking it to disallow a current deduction. The Hightower court upheld a current demolition deduction because the wording of the regulation is not contrary to the statute, and the interpretation of the wording should reflect the reasonable person's viewpoint of a requirement.
Following the Landerman rationale, the Eighth Circuit in Foltz v.
United States41 asserted that a strict interpretation of the regulation
would circumvent the intent of the drafters of the Code on loss deductions. Since the regulation only clarifies the Code, its interpretation
must be consistent with the Code. To allow a current deduction when
the lease requires demolition (regardless of the particular wording in
the lease) arguably violates Code section 165(a)42 which allows deductions for only uncompensated losses.
While the courts have differed on the scope of the regulation, the
wording of the leases in the instant cases has not conflicted with the
precise wording of the regulation. Each case4 3 gave the lessee "permission" 44 to demolish or the "right"" to demolish rather than "requiring" demolition. The ostensible compliance with the wording of
the regulation has caused many courts to scrutinize the intention of
39. Id. at 341.
40. 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
41. 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
42. See note 14 supra.
43. The one exception is Levinson, where demolition was not mentioned in the
lease.
44. Hightower v. United States, 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972); Foltz v. United
States, 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
45. Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964); Landerman v. Commissioner,
454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972); Holder v. United
States, 444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the parties rather than stopping with a resolution of the wording problem.
INTENT

To DEMOLISH

Both sides in the wording conflict agree that the ultimate decision
to allow a present deduction should resolve the factual question of
intent. However, the courts disagree on the permissible scope of an
inquiry into intent. The Feldman rationale presumes that a formalized agreement permitting demolition prima facie evidences an intent
not !to demolish. In Feldman, the land was not the sole object bargained-for and the building purportedly had value to both parties.
Where there is no commitment to demolish, the lease includes the
right to put the buildings to beneficial use and a portion of the
rental may well be attributed to them. It may well be said that
they have not yet lost their status as income-producing property.
The Regulation appears simply to shift emphasis upon the factual
issue of intent. Of the many rights secured to the parties and
presumably bargained for, stress is laid upon the right to put the
property to beneficial use instead of upon the right to demolish
it. Instead of inviting an examination into the possibility that
something of value really was not important, the Regulation presumes that it was unless the parties have formally demonstrated in
the manner specified that it was the land alone which was bargained
46
for.

The Feldman rationale limits judicial inquiry into the intent of the
parties regarding demolition because Feldman states that the regulation has settled the question of intent by implying its absence in a
"permissive" context.
The inflexible reading of the regulation makes the interpretation
of Feldman less persuasive because substance should prevail over
form.4 7 The Landerman rationale examines all the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease in resolving the intent
question. Invoking the doctrine of substance over form, the Landerman court disregards the wording of the lease in deciding whether the
46. 335 F.2d at 266.
47. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), afj'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
In the lower court opinion, 69 F.2d at 810-11, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We agree with the Board [of Tax Appeals] and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. . . . Therefore,
if what was done here, was what was intended by [the statute], it is of no
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parties actually intended to raze the building at the execution of the
lease. If the wording of the particular lease controlled, a carefully
drafted lease would include only words of permission and not of requirement to assure a current deduction to the lessor. This approach
disregards the real agreement of the parties and obscures their real
intent regarding demolition. A finding of intent, based upon a presumption that the wording represents the parties' actual intent, should
be rebuttable upon a showing of conflicting surrounding circumstances
and prior negotiations of the parties.
The Foltz dissent enunciated the difficulty of an intent test that goes
beyond the precise wording of the regulation. The dissenting judge
in Foltz would not allow earlier negotiations of the parties to affect
the interpretation given to the wording of the lease.
To speculate upon what the parties anticipated would occur by
reference to earlier negotiations seems to me to be akin to the
admission of parol evidence to alter or vary the terms of an unambiguous written instrument. The history of the regulation itself
supports this conclusion. If the authors had intended to exclude
from the provisions of section 165 all demolitions which were contemplated (and necessarily permitted) under the provisions of a
lease, the originally proposed language "pursuant to
the terms of
48
a lease" would have been adequate for such purpose.
The regulations, however, state that substance and not mere form shall
govern in the determination of a deductible loss under Code section
165(a). 49 To effectuate the doctrine of substance over form, the regulations concerning demolition losses generally presuppose an inquiry
into the intent of the taxpayer.
The question as to the taxpayer's intention is not answered by any
inference that is drawn from any one fact or circumstance but can
be answered only by a consideration of all relevant facts and circonsequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income taxes,
as it certainly was. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to
cover such a transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the
Board has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be
more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes,
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in
which all appear, and which all collectively create.
48. 458 F.2d at 604.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1960):
(b) Nature of loss allowable. To be allowable as a deduction under section 165(a), a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions,
fixed by identifiable events, and . . . actually sustained during the taxable
year. Only a bona fide loss is allowable. Substance and not mere form shall
govern in determining a deductible loss.
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circumstances
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn there50
from.

Regulation 1.165-3(a) disallows a current deduction if the intent to
demolish exists at the time of the acquisition of the property."' How-

ever, regulation 1.165-3(b)(1) permits a current loss deduction if the
taxpayer forms an intent to demolish subsequent to the acquisition of
the property.52 While the regulation concerning demolition losses of
a leased building does not specifically discuss intent, the intent of the
parties should be as controlling on the deductibility of demolition

losses in a leasing context as in a non-leasing context.
Furthermore, the parol evidence rule does not bar an inquiry into
the intent of the parties.

Because the courts have made the wording

of the demolition loss regulation uncertain, leasing agreements relying
upon the language of the regulation cannot be unambiguous. There-

fore, extrinsic evidence bearing upon intent does not alter, modify or
vary the terms of a written demolition agreement.53 Admitting evidence of intent will not solve the demolition deduction issue until the
courts have established consistent standards to determine intent.
The courts currently apply a variety of standards in assessing the intent

of the parties to a leasing agreement involving demolition.
The courts should use the length of time between the leasing of
the property and its subsequent demolition as a standard in assessing
the intent of the parties. The Feldman lessee demolished the building

approximately two and one-half years after the execution of the lease;
however, the court of appeals did not consider this delay a significant
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(c) (1960).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1) (1960):
(a) Intent to demolish formed at time of purchase. (1) Except as provided
in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the following rule shall apply when,
in the course of a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit,
real property is purchased with the intention of demolishing either immediately or subsequently the buildings situated thereon:
No deduction shall be allowed under section 165(a) on account of the demolition of the old buildings even though any demolition originally planned is subsequently deferred or abandoned. The entire basis of the property so purchased shall . . . be allocated to the land only. Such basis shall be increased
by the net cost of such demolition or decreased by the net proceeds from
demolition.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1) (1960):
(b) Intent to demolish formed subsequent to the time of acquisition. (1)
Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the loss incurred
in a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit and arising
from a demolition of old buildings shall be allowed as a deduction under section 165(a) if the demolition occurs as a result of a plan formed subsequent
to the acquisition of the buildings demolished. The amount of the loss shall
be the adjusted basis of the buildings demolished increased by the net cost
of demolition or decreased by the net proceeds from demolition. .

.

. The

basis of any building acquired in replacement of the old buildings shall not
include any part of the basis of the property demolished.
53. RESrATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS 88 237-242 (1932).

643

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 632

fact because the wording of the lease was controlling on the question
of intent. In Hightower, while the lessee demolished the buildings
only five and one-half months after acquisition, the Fifth Circuit
followed Feldman. In Foltz the demolition occurred approximately
one and one-half years after the lessees took possession of the property;5 4 yet the Eighth Circuit did not consider this long delay controlling.,
The only case which considered timing important was Landerman
in which the lessee demolished the structure after eight months.
According to Landerman the timing of the demolition substantially resolves the deduction issue because, to be nondeductible as a current
loss, the demolition must be an underlying condition of the lease at
the time of execution. If the demolition took place early in the leasehold, the courts should presume that the parties preconceived the
demolition. 55 If more than one year elapsed from the execution of
the lease to the demolition of the building, intervening circumstances
probably made the building no longer useful. In the latter instance,
the parties probably did not bargain for the land alone.16
The courts should also inquire into the pre-lease negotiations allocating the demolition costs between the parties as another standard determining intent. With rare exceptions, the courts have disregarded
this aspect of the issue of intent. The Hightower court said that both
parties to the lease knew that the lessee required a demolition provision
and/or an option to purchase in the lease before executing it. The
court did not regard this fact as significant because the Fifth Circuit
followed the "plain-meaning" rule of Feldman.
Leases commonly include permissive demolition clauses as a practical necessity if the lease term is lengthy and the existing building has
a relatively short useful life. 57 Without such a clause the lessee has
54. Holding likewise was Holder v. United States in which demolition occurred one
and one-half years after execution of the lease.
55. 458 F.2d at 604.
56. In Levinson, demolition took place immediately. Though demolition was not
mentioned in the lease, the lessors were obligated to erect a new building on the premises for the lessee. In order to do so, the lessors had to demolish the existing building. [The fact that demolition is carried out by the lessor is generally held to be
irrelevant. See Nicholl's Estate v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1960), and
Raby, New Regulations Clarify Loss on Demolition of Leased Property, 13 J. OF TAXAThe Tax Court in Levinson relied on Landerman, holding
TION, 227, 228 (1960).]
that demolition was an underlying condition of the lease and thus a "requirement" under the regulation, in spite of the lessors' assertion that the regulation was inapplicable
since it was not the land for which bargaining took place. The lessors asserted that
demolition occurred in order to have the use of a new, bargained-for building. In any
case, the timing of the demolition made it apparent that destruction of the building
had been previously contemplated.
57. Raby, New Regulations Clarify Loss on Demolition of Leased Property, 13 J.

OF TAxATiON, 227, 228 (1960).
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no right to demolish existing buildings that become useless due to
casualty or gradual deterioration. Consequently, pre-lease negotiations
allocating the costs of demolition should not alone dispose of the question of intent. The courts should especially consider which party to
the lease suggested the insertion of the permissive provision.A
A significant circumstance of any leasing agreement is the relationship of the lease term to the remaining useful life of the leased premises. In Feldman the government urged that since the term of the
lease exceeded the remaining useful life of the demolished building,
the lessor had no economic interest in that building subject to a loss
deduction. 9 Relying on Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner,6 0 which
states that a taxpayer can depreciate property even if the useful life
of the property is less than the lease term, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the government's argument. Because the lessor can continue to depreciate the leased building before demolition, he has retained his capital investment in the property regardless of the length of the lease,
and he should not lose the tax benefit of a current demolition deduction.
Revenue Ruling 67-410 contradicts this rationale by presuming an
intent to demolish when the useful life of the demolished building is
shorter than the term of the lease absent other evidence of the parties' intent.6 1 Not only does this Ruling conflict with Alaska Realty,
but it also conflicts with the regulation on demolition losses in a leasing context. The regulation only makes a presumption of intent if the
lease "requires" demolition because a requirement presumes that the
parties bargained for the demolition costs before executing the lease. 2
The suitability of the existing improvements for the lessee's intended use at the execution of the lease clearly aids the evaluation
of any purported pre-existing intention to demolish. If the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the lessee's intended use did not relate to
an appropriate or feasible use of the existing building, a strong presumption of a preconceived intent to demolish should exist. In that
58. For example, in Foltz, the permissive demolition clause was inserted into the
lease at the suggestion of the lessee's counsel as a protective provision in light of the
long lease term. 322 F. Supp. 414, 416 (W.D. Ark. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 600 (8th

Cir. 1972).
59. 335 F.2d at 265-66.
60. 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(4) (1960);
St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1941), dictum; 4 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.89 (1973 rev.).
61. See note 30 supra.
62. The district court in Holder approved this reasoning and declared the ruling
to be erroneous where in conflict with the regulations. 70-2 U.S.T.C. 84,672, 84,67374 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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instance the courts could justly say the lease "required" demolition
within the meaning of the regulation.
The Fifth Circuit has not consistently applied this standard of intent.
In Holder v. United States6" the parties stipulated that, at the execution of the lease, the lessee had definite plans to use part of the land
for a parking facility and to sublease the remainder of the premises
(including the building) to the prior lessees for an indefinite period.
The lessee in Hightower wanted the leased premises for a savings and
loan facility. At the execution of the lease three 100-year-old row
houses were built on the land. While the Fifth Circuit in Hightower
allowed a current deduction to the lessor, it disallowed a current deduction in Holder, notwithstanding an apparent preconceived intent
to demolish in Hightower and the absence of such an intent in Holder.
The court reconciled its two apparently inconsistent opinions on other
64
grounds.
While the Fifth Circuit has taken an ambiguous position on the suitability test, the Seventh Circuit has apparently adopted this test as a
measure of the parties' intent. In Landerman the lessee desired to
erect a multi-story parking garage on premises which already contained
a furnished building. The prior intent to demolish clearly stands out
in this case and justifies the Seventh Circuit's denial of a demolition
deduction.
The Eighth Circuit has extended the suitability test to include situations involving alterations but not demolition of the leased premises.
In Foltz the lessee wanted to construct a tunnel between his building
and the leased premises to assure adjacent ground space for future expansion. As a condition of the lease, the lessee required the lessor not
to remove fixtures already in the leased premises. Until a general
contractor concluded that constructing a tunnel between the two buildings was not feasible, the lessee had opposed any demolition.6 5 Notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of a preconceived intention to
demolish, the Eighth Circuit denied a demolition deduction by invok63.
64.

444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Hightower, the court stated:

This decision is not inconsistent with our holding in Holder v. United States,
444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971). There we held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to a loss because the lease required the tenant to replace the demol-

ished building with other buildings meeting certain specifications and value.

Thus "they were compensated for their loss by the lessee's contractual duty

to construct other improvements to be delivered to taxpayers at the termina-

tion of the lease (p. 1300)." There is no such contractual duty under the
Hightower lease. 463 F.2d 182, 183 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. 322 F. Supp. at 417.
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The Eighth Circuit has probably carried the

suitability test to an unreasonable point.

The inquiry into intent should not degenerate into a battle of semantics, and the courts should not carry the intent test to extremes.

A

set of guidelines such as those set forth in regulation 1.165-3(c) for
non-lease demolitions is essential to a consistent judicial analysis of
the parties' intent. 68

Other criteria of intent uniquely applicable to

lease situations should supplement the evidence of intent already enumerated in this regulation. The standards already considered in this
note should aid the Service in establishing new measures of intent in
a leasing context.
If the negotiations of the parties to the lease show that they intended demolition from the outset,6 7 no demolition loss deduction should
be allowable, notwithstanding the actual wording of the lease. If the
parties merely discussed the possibility of demolition, or if the parties
inserted a permissive demolition clause into the lease to protect the

lessee who had no intent to demolish immediately, the courts should
66.

Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(c)(2) (1960):
(2) An intention at the time of acquisition to demolish may be suggested
by:
(i) A short delay between the date of acquisition and the date of demolition;
(ii) Evidence of prohibitive remodeling costs determined at the time of
acquisition;
(iii) Existence of municipal regulations at the time of acquisition which
would prohibit the continued use of the buildings for profit purposes;
(iv) Unsuitability of the buildings for the taxpayer's trade or business at
the time of acquisition; or
(v) Inability at the time of acquisition to realize a reasonable income
from the buildings.
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(c)(3) (1960):
(3) The fact that the demolition occurred pursuant to a plan formed subsequent to the acquisition of the property may be suggested by:
(i) Substantial improvement of the buildings immediately after their acquisition;
(ii) Prolonged use of the buildings for business purposes after their acquisition;
(iii) Suitability of the buildings for investment purposes at the time of
acquisition;
(iv) Substantial change in economic or business conditions after the date
of acquisition;
(v) Loss of useful value occurring after the date of acquisition;
(vi) Substantial damage to the buildings occurring after their acquisition;
(vii) Discovery of latent structural defects in the buildings after their acquisition;
(viii) Decline in the taxpayer's business after the date of acquisition;
(ix) Condemnation of the property by municipal authorities after the date
of acquisition; or
(x) Inability after acquisition to obtain building material necessary for the
improvement of the property.
67. The intent to demolish must be dominant at the time of acquisition of the property if a depreciation deduction is to be allowed; Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.
v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1266 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 867
(1974); Wagner v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 84,070 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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not deny current demolition deductions on the basis of the old "substitution of assets" theory.
QUID PRO Quo

The IRS has reduced the issue of compensation for the loss of demolished premises to a question of intent. If the intent to demolish
existed before the party took possession, no current demolition loss
is allowable. No further inquiry into compensation for the loss is necessary. Whether the terms of a lease should expand the inquiry into
compensation for the demolition has resulted in a variety of judicial
postures.
Earlier courts generally applied the "substitution of assets" theory
in deciding whether the demolition of leased premises had resulted
in an uncompensated loss within the meaning of section 165(a). The
older cases stated that if there was a "substitution of assets," i.e., the
lease for the building, there was no immediate deduction because
there was no economic loss. 68 Later courts like Feldman have not
inquired into the net economic advantage to the lessor from the demolition. Feldman stated that a lessor would not allow demolition unless
he expected some benefit.
We can hardly conceive that an owner would agree to demolition
unless he felt it to be to his financial advantage. The Code and
Regulations must, then, contemplate that there will be occasions
where a financially advantageous demolition may constitute a loss
for tax purposes. 69
The Feldman court concluded that, absent a "requirement" to demolish, the lease did not provide the lessor with a compensated loss
for the demolition.
Other courts have approached the compensation inquiry with a twofold test: (1) Does the lease permit or require a demolition; and
(2) Has the taxpayer actually suffered an uncompensated loss. The
answer to the latter question depends upon all the facts and circumstances, and the priority given any fact or circumstance varies with
the different courts. In Holder the court of appeals looked for an
uncompensated loss before asking whether the lease required or permitted the demolition. In Foltz and in Landerman the court of appeals looked for permission to demolish before deciding whether the
lessor had an uncompensated loss.
68.
69.

See text accompanying notes 14 through 24 supra.
335 F.2d at 266.
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Notwithstanding the different order of inquiry in this two-part test,
the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have agreed that a conflict between the Code and a strict construction of the regulation results
from the absence of any judicial inquiry into compensation for the
demolition loss. 7 0 The regulation on demolition losses of leased premises does not specifically state that a requirement to demolish results
in compensation to the lessor. On the other hand, if the demolition
is permissive, the regulation by implication allows a current deduction
without an actual showing of no compensation from the lessee to the
lessor. To prevent an otherwise unallowable deduction for a compensated loss based on a literal reading of the regulation, the several circuits of the court of appeals have established inconsistent standards
to measure compensation to the lessor for a demolition of his premises
after the execution of a lease.
Several courts have discussed rental rates as a measure of compensation to the lessor for his demolition losses. The Foltz court noted
that the lease rentals exceeded amounts discussed in prior negotiations
with a different prospective lessee to whom the lessor had refused
demolition. The rental rate under the executed lease did not change
irrespective of demolition. These facts led the court to presume that
the rental rate compensated the lessor for the demolition. In disallowing a current demolition deduction, the Foltz court considered the fact
of a constant rental rate as practically dispositive of the compensation
question.
On the contrary, in Holder the fact that the rental rate remained
constant over the term of the lease did not influence the court in its
ultimate decision to disallow a current demolition deduction. The
Feldman court discussed the change in rental rates occurring two years
after the execution of the lease and irrespective of demolition. It did
not consider the economic ramifications of a demolition occurring almost simultaneously with the raise in rent in reaching its decision to
allow a current deduction. The Feldman court has clearly abandoned
any judicial inquiry into compensation for the demolition.
In Levinson v. Commissioner7 the lease provided for rent that did
not exceed the rent obtainable on vacant land. To comply with a
lease requirement to build a new structure, the lessors demolished the
70. The courts justified this further inquiry on the basis of the maxim that since
deductions are a matter of grace and not of right, taxpayers are not entitled to deductions unless they are able to bring themselves within the applicable statutory provision.
Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931); Landerman v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 338,
341 (7th Cir. 1971); Foltz v. United States, 458 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1972).

71. 59 T.C. 676 (1973).
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existing structure. In denying a current demolition loss deduction, the
Tax Court found that the rent under the lease did not establish the
asserted lack of compensation to the lessor for the demolition but only
reached the adequacy of the compensation. 2
The courts have also considered the payment of the demolition
costs by the lessee, the presence of a reverter clause for the lessor
and the subsequent sale of the leased property to the lessee as other
standards of compensation. In most cases, the lessee bore the cost
of demolition. The Landerman court treated this payment as compensation to the lessor for the demolition because otherwise, as in Levinson, the lessor bore the demolition costs. 73 Agreeing with Landerman, the Foltz court stated that the payment of demolition costs was
"another indication that [the] lessor has received something in exchange for . . . accession to demolition . . . -74 The Foltz court
also found that a reverter clause in the lease was evidence of compensation for the demolition. This argument seems frivolous because
in the absence of a contrary clause in the lease the building becomes
the property of the lessor at the expiration of the lease or at the
lessee's earlier forfeiture or default.
A subsequent sale of the property pursuant to a prearranged agreement makes a stronger argument for compensation to the lessor. In
Hightower the government argued that the parties to the lease looked
primarily toward the sale of the property. The government also argued
that the lessors would only sustain a deductible loss at the time
of a subsequent sale if the sales price did not exceed the lessors' adjusted basis in the property."5 Construing the arrangement between
the parties as a lease and not as a sale, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument summarily. 6
The strongest argument for a finding of compensation is a requirement to rebuild in the lease. Two cases discussed such a lease
clause. 7 In Holder if the lessee demolished pursuant to permission
72.

Id.

73. 454 F.2d at 341-42; see also note 56 supra.
74. 458 F.2d at 603.
75. 346 F. Supp. 707, 712 (M.D. Fla. 1971). This argument was used with more
success in Blumenfield Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 665, 671 (1955),
aft'd, 232 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956).
76. Id. at 712.
77. The Feldman and Levinson situations are not directly appropriate to the question of compensation for a replacement structure, though in both cases there was a
requirement to build a new structure. In Feldman the lessee was required to build
a new structure by the end of the lease term even if there were no demolition. The
Levinson situation did not directly address the issue of compensation to the lessor for
the loss of his building through demolition since in that case the lessor was required
to build on the premises as a condition of the lease.

650

1974

Deductibility of Demolition Losses

granted in the lease, he had to erect new improvements to a specified
footage and value worth one and one-half times the value of the existing improvements. The lease also specified that the new building had
to be serviceable as a warehouse or as an office building. The Holder
court considered these facts decisive in its finding of compensation
for the demolition. The dissent in Foltz considered the requirement
of a replacement structure as the only measure of compensation to
the lessor for the demolition and stated that courts should not attempt
to
substitute an evaluation of incidental benefits which may or
may not inure to the lessor, together with a court determination
that such benefits offset the destruction of a depreciable asset
. [T]he destruction of the building must be separately ana...
were not mandated by
lyzed and not lumped with benefits which
78
the lease as a result of such demolition.
While the only benefit balanced against the loss of depreciation deductions due to demolition should be the type and value of -the replacement structure, a building useful only to the lessee should not
be compensation. However, if the lessor required the lessee to build
a replacement structure to certain specifications (such as type, cost
and/or footage as in Holder), demolition would be bargained-for,
and the lessor would not have suffered a currently deductible loss.
Since the old "substitution of assets" theory treated the lease rather
than a new building as the asset bargained-for, a replacement structure was not necessary to a finding of compensation for the demolished
structure. 79 The courts should now apply a modified "substitution of
assets" theory that requires a new structure for the demolished structure as in Holder before finding consideration for the demolition. The
economic adequacy and not only the legal sufficiency of the consideration to the lessor for the demolition should control the ultimate finding of compensation to the lessor.
CONCLUSION

While this writer agrees with the Service's position that the existing
regulation is inadequate, this writer does not think that the proposed
regulation solves the deduction problem. The proposed regulation on
demolition deductions in a leasing context brings the taxpayer back
to the old "substitution of assets" theory and effectively ends all current tax deductions. Since the Service has not expressed any intention
78.
79.

458 F.2d at 606.
Berger v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1339, 1346 (1946).
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to revise the entire demolition loss regulations, a loss currently deductible in a non-lease context contrasts sharply with a loss not currently
deductible in a leasing context. By adopting an intent test and a modfied "substitution of assets" theory, the Service will avoid harsh inequities due to the existing mechanical test of regulation 1.165-3(b)(2)
and will make the demolition loss regulations thoroughly consistent.
Through the substitution of an intent test for the existing regulation
on demolition losses in a leasing context, the Service can improve upon
the criteria already developed by the courts and can add criteria specifically related to intent in the framework of lease agreements. The
enactment of specific Service guidelines will encourage consistency
among the circuits and should provide an orderly development in cases
of first impression.
LINDA KREER WITT
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